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Abstract
This paper examines the (non) equivalance between aid °ows and
trade preferences as alternative forms of donor assistance in the pres-
ence of learning-by-doing externalities in recipient country export pro-
duction. Using a two-period model based on van Wijnbergen (1985), in
which the productivity externality consistituestheonly (inter-temporal)
distortion, we show that switching donor support on the margin from
aid to trade preferences can increase recipient country welfare. To eval-
uate the size of this potential welfare gain to small African economies
we simulate donor policy reforms using a dynamic CGE model where
the productivity externality may also interact with private capital ac-
cumulation. We show that for reasonable values of key behavioural
parameters, the potential growth and welfare gains from a (donor) rev-
enue neutral re-orientation of assistance to developing countries could
be substantial. The paper concludes by considering why these potential
dynamic gains appear to be unexpoited by both donors and recipients.
Keywords: Foreign Aid, Trade Preferences, Africa.
JEL Codes: F35 , O41, O55.
1 Introduction
Developing and industrial countries are bound together by means of both
aid and trade. Not surprisingly, therefore, the question of how to assess the
relative value of these two types of transaction is a recurring one. Johnson
(1967), for example, provided a simple general equilibrium treatment of the
question in which he showed that in circumstances where incentives in the
recipient country were distorted in favour of import-substituting produc-
tion, a developing country would unambiguously prefer a dollar of aid to an
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1Johnson￿s presumption in favour of aid by considering how aid-tying or the
degree of concessionality may reduce the value of a dollar of aid (for exam-
ple, Thirlwall 1976, Mosley 1988, Morrissey and White 1996). In this paper
w ea r g u et h a tb yp l a c i n gt h ei m p l i c i tc o s t - b e n e ￿t calculation in a context
where the donor faces costs of alternative transfer arrangements but where
there may also be unexploited dynamic gains to trade through learning-by-
doing externalities, the balance shifts decisively in favour of market access
(i.e. trade) rather than aid.
Our starting point is the observation that, other things equal, aid re-
duces export competitiveness in the recipient country by appreciating the
recipient￿s real exchange rate. Van Wijnbergen (1985) used this observation
to argue that aid to Africa should be conditional on the removal of policy
biases against exports. We use this logic to shift the focus onto the pol-
icy choices of the donor rather than the recipient by developing a simple
and obvious corollary, which is that a dollar of donor resources transferred
to the recipient via the donor￿s own import liberalization is better for the
recipient￿s exports than a dollar transferred via grants. In the absence of
distortions or distributional considerations, the eﬀect on exports makes no
diﬀerence for the recipient￿s welfare, and both donor and recipient are indif-
ferent as to the form of assistance. But if there are externalities to exporting,
a shift from aid to trade can make both parties better oﬀ.
Concern with this is question is not merely academic. A striking fea-
ture of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations was the almost complete
absence of African countries at the bargaining table. At one level this ab-
sence was unremarkable: small trade volumes make many African countries
uninteresting bargaining partners. But the situation is nonetheless unset-
tling. Presumably African countries have at least as much to gain from
increased exports as do other countries. Although the empirical relevance of
productivity spillovers from exporting is a matter of continuing debate (e.g.
Bayoumi, Coe and Helpman, 1999), export promotion policies are widely
regarded as having played an important role in the growth of East Asian
countries (e.g., Westphal, 1990). Recent empirical evidence also suggests
that not only does export performance play an important role in African
growth (for example, Ndulu and Ndung￿u 1997), but also that export perfor-
mance is signi￿cantly determined by real exchange rate movements (Bigsten
et al, 1999, Elbadawi, 1999, and Sekkat and Varoudakis, 2000). Moreover, as
GATT negotiations proceeded African governments were receiving billions
of dollars in grants and technical assistance conditional on liberalizing their
own import regimes. The logic of this paper suggests, ￿rst, that African
countries should have been intensely interested in gaining trade concessions
in developing country markets in return for their own reductions of trade
barriers, and second, that some of the assistance ￿o w i n gt oA f r i c as h o u l d
have been devoted to strengthening Africa￿s engagement with the Uruguay
Round.
2The paper is structured as follows. In Sections 2 and 3 we develop a
simple theoretical model to study the relationship between aid and ￿open￿
trade preferences in the presence of learning-by-doing externalities.1 We
generate a set of presumptions about welfare comparisons in the context
of a simple endowment economy. In Section 4 we move to a more fully
articulated CGE model of a stylized African economy which embodies the
essential mechanics of our theoretical model whilst enabling us to get a
sense of the likely empirical magnitudes involved. To do so we disaggregate
on the production and consumption sides, bring in savings and investment,
and impose a realistically non-neutral tax structure. We then simulate the
eﬀects of a shift at the margin from grants to tariﬀ preferences. The results
are striking. Depending on the calibration of the spillover eﬀect and the
structure of domestic taxation, this switch from aid to trade raises exports
by around 6 percent over a 5-year horizon and by as much as 16 percent in
the new steady state. The associated learning-by-doing spillovers contribute
to a permanent welfare increase on the order of 5 percent.
That these results are sizeable poses a set of further questions that we
explore in the ￿nal section, not the least of which is why such large ef-
￿ciency gains remain on the table. We appeal here to distributional con-
siderations, arguing that these considerations increase both the supply of
grants by donors and the demand for grants by recipients relative to trade
preferences.
2 Static Eﬀects of Aid and Trade Preferences
We consider a small open economy that produces and consumes a nontraded
domestic good with price PN and faces world prices PXand PM for its homo-
geneous export and import. Exports are not consumed at home and there
is no competing production of imports. Capital stocks are sector-speci￿c;
a ￿xed endowment L of labor moves freely between sectors to equalize real
consumption wages.
We begin by demonstrating the static equivalence of aid and tariﬀ pref-
erences in the absence of distortions. Using Q = PN/PM and QX = PN/PX
to denote the real exchange rates for imports and exports respectively, then
T = Q/QX is the small country￿s terms of trade in international markets.
Macroeconomic equilibrium holds when desired aggregate spending equals
aggregate income at full employment and the trade balance is equal to the
exogenously given aid in￿ow (there are no other international capital ￿ows).
Using revenue and expenditure functions (see Dixit and Norman, 1980) we
1An open or unrestricted preference is constrained only by country-of-origin restrictions
and is thus equivalent to a terms of trade gain to a small recipient. This contrasts with a
closed preference which is applicable to a ￿xed quantity of exports.
3express this relationship as:
E(PN,P M,U)=R(PN,P X;L)+PMA. (1)
Normalizing the world price of imports we re-express (1) as
E(Q,1,U)=R(Q,T;L)+A (2)
w h e r eAi sa i dm e a s u r e di ni m p o r t s ,Ui su t i l i t y ,a n ds u b s c r i p t sd e n o t e
partial derivatives with respect to the relevant arguments. By the properties
of the revenue and expenditure functions, we can express the supply and
compensated demand functions for nontraded goods as EQ and RQ leading
to market clearing condition in the non-traded goods market
EQ(Q,1,U)=RQ(Q,T;L). (3)
G D Pm e a s u r e di ni m p o r t e dg o o d si s
R/PM = QRQ + TR X. (4)
In what follows we suppress the labor supply argument in the revenue func-
tion. Taken together, equations (2) and (3) imply that the trade balance is
equal to exogenously given aid ￿ows:
EM(Q,1,U) − TRX(Q,T)=A. (5)
Turning to the donor we can consider two alternative ways of generating
a transfer of amount dZ measured in terms of the recipient￿s import good.
One way to do this is simply to increase grants by dA = dZ.I n d o i n g
so we assume that the donor calculates the ￿transfer￿ value of the trade
preference as the amount of tariﬀ r e v e n u el o s ta tt h eoriginal exportvolumes.
Alternatively, however, the donor can reduce the tariﬀ facing the recipient￿s
export good. In doing so we assume that the donor calculates the transfer
value of the trade preference as the recipients revenue gain at the original
export volume.2 Measured in terms of the recipient￿s import good, this
is dPX(RX/PM)=RXdT (noting that dPM = 0). The donor￿s budget
2Hence we assume that the preference-receiving country is small relative to third-party
exporters to the donor. The world price PM is thus determined by costs of the third-party
exporters and the domestic price of the good in the donor country is (1 + τ)PM where τ
is the tariﬀ. Assuming the recipient is small relative to other exporters allows us to ignore
third-party welfare eﬀects arising from trade diversion.
4constraint for alternative forms of the transfer is thus:3
dZ = dA + RXdT. (6)
Totally diﬀerentiating (2), (3), and (6) yields the following expressions for



















RQ > 0a n d∆Q =
QEQQ
EQ < 0. A transfer therefore generates
an income eﬀect that increases utility (equation (7)). Moreover, the recipi-
ent is indiﬀerent as to whether the transfer comes in the form of aid or tariﬀ
preferences: only the total amount, dZ,a ﬀects utility. The response of the
import real exchange rate, in contrast, depends on the form of the transfer.
The spending eﬀect of the transfer (the term involving dZ in (8)) appre-
ciates the real exchange since part of the increased overall spending falls
on nontraded goods. Tariﬀ preferences, however, draw resources out of the
nontraded good sector (the ￿nal term in (8)), requiring a real appreciation
(other things equal) to restore equilibrium. A terms-of-trade improvement
therefore appreciates the real exchange rate for imports by more than an
otherwise equivalent pure grant.
The eﬀect of these developments on exports is fully summarized by the
change in the real exchange rate for exports, QX This is calculated as






The spending eﬀect of the transfer appreciates the real exchange for exports.
Tariﬀ preferences appreciate the real exchange rate by less than pure grants,
however, since the demand elasticity ∆Q is negative. It follows that tariﬀ
preferences unambiguously leave the recipient with higher exports than un-
der an otherwise equivalent grant.
3Strictly the donor￿s budget constraint is
dZ = dA + RXdT[1 + (τ + dT)σXX]
where τ is the initial tariﬀ preference, dT is the preference increase, and σXX = TRXX/RX
i st h ee l a s t i c i t yo fe x p o r ts u p p l y .I nt h ec a s ew h e r et h ep r e f e r e n c ei s￿ c l o s e d ￿t h e nσXX =0
by constraint and the donor￿s cost is exactly as (6). For open preferences, equation (6)
holds provided that the initial preference (τ) is zero and the change under consideration
is small (so that dT
2 vanishes). In the simulation model presented below we maintain the
assumption of zero initial preferences but consider non-marginal changes in the preference.
5The absolute eﬀect of tariﬀ preferences depends in a familiar way on the
relative strength of income and substitution terms in (9). Substituting for
dZ using equation (6), we get the following expression for the elasticity of
the export real exchange rate with respect to trade preferences
∂ lnQX
∂ lnT







The real exchange rate for exports therefore depreciates (and exports rise)
if substitution on the demand side is suﬃciently high relative to the impact
eﬀect of the transfer on real income.
3 Dynamic Spillovers and Export Subsidies
To incorporate dynamic issues we consider the eﬀects of temporary transfers
in a two-period extension of the above model inspired by van Wijnbergen
(1985). Using upper-case letters to refer to ￿rst-period values and lower-
case to refer to second-period values, we assume that ￿rms in the export
sector bene￿t from learning-by-doing spillovers that are sector-speci￿cb u t
not appropriable by individual ￿rms. Exports and income in period 2 there-
fore depend not only on the real exchange rate for exports, q, but also on
￿rst-period exports: denoting exports and GDP in period 2 by rt(q,t,RX)
and r(q,t,RX), we will assume rqR < 0, rtR > 0a n drR > 0.4 Letting S
be the subsidy per unit (measured in imported goods) given to exports in
the ￿rst period, so that T +S is the price facing producers, the equilibrium
conditions become:
E(Q,1,U)=R(Q,T + S)+A − SRX (11)
EQ(Q,1,U)=RQ(Q,T + S) (12)
e(q,1,u)=r(q,1,R X) (13)
eq(q,1,u)=rq(q,1,R X) (14)
w h e r ew eh a v es e tt h e( e x o g e n o u sa n d￿xed) second-period terms of trade
equal to 1. Note that learning-by-doing provides the only inter-temporal
linkage in the model because the trade balance is exogenously determined
by aid ￿ows. As before, tariﬀ preferences amount to an improvement in the
￿rst-period terms of trade.
Totally diﬀerentiating (11) - (14), we solve for the endogenous variables
Q, U, q and u in terms of A and T and the subsidy rate S as follows:
EUdU = dA + RXdT − S[RXQdQ + RXX(dT + dS)] (15)
4Spillovers therefore create a biased shift in the production possibility frontier for pe-





(dA + RXdT) − (1 − αNs)RQX(dT + dS) (16)




[RXQdQ + RXX(dT + dS)] (18)
where Λ =( 1− αNs)RQQ − EQQ > 0,0< αN =
QEQU
EU < 1,06 s =
S





Since export spillovers are the only inter-temporal linkage in the model,
equations (15) and (16) fully determine dU and dQ as functions of dA,
dT and dS.5 Equation (15) solves for dU using the ￿rst-period income -
expenditure equation (11); equation (16) then solves for dQ using (15) and
the nontraded goods market-clearing equation (12).
Consider ￿rst the eﬀect of dA, dT and dS on ￿rst-period relative prices
(equation (16)). The income eﬀect of a transfer appreciates the real exchange
rate for imports in proportion to the marginal propensity to spend on non-
traded goods, N; as before, this occurs whether the transfer comes as a grant
or as the tariﬀ-preference equivalent of a grant (recall that dZ = dA+RXdT
is the value of the marginal transfer). Also as before, tariﬀ preferences ap-
preciate the real exchange rate for imports by more than pure transfers ￿
the term -(1 − αNs)RQX in equation (16) is positive. As in the static case
it follows that the real exchange rate for exports is depreciated relative to
its level under pure transfers. Holding the subsidy rate constant, therefore,
tariﬀ preferences are unambiguously better for exports than pure grants.
Export subsidies appreciate the real exchange rate for imports in (16) as a
direct result of their stimulative eﬀect on exports.
Given the real exchange rate, ￿rst-period utility is determined in equa-
tion (15). The income eﬀect of a transfer raises utility. In this case, however,
tariﬀ preferences actually exert a drag on ￿rst-period utility relative to a
pure transfer: as we have seen, the tariﬀ preferences reduce exports by less
(and may actually increase them on net) and hence leave a larger ￿rst-period
distortion operating through the subsidy. By the same token, the eﬀect of
a higher export subsidy, other things equal, is to reduce ￿rst-period utility
by increasing the distortion.
T h er e a le x c h a n g er a t ef o ri m p o r t sa n dt h es u b s i d y - i n c l u s i v et e r m so f
trade, T + S, are parameters of the second-period equilibrium. Since
RXQdQ + RXX(dT + dS)=−(T + S)RXX ￿ QX (19)
we can see that both utility and the relative prices in period 2 depend only
on the real exchange rate for exports from period 1. Anything that creates a
real depreciation in period 1 produces spillover bene￿ts that raise utility in
5When S = dS = 0 so that there is no export subsidy (15) and (16) are identical to
(7) and (8) in the static case.
7period 2 (equation (17)); and the real exchange rate in period 2 appreciates
(equation (18)).
The optimal export subsidy can now be calculated by choosing S to
maximize the social welfare function W = W(U,u). The ￿rst-order con-
dition for this problem is WUUS = −WuuS. By inspection of (15) - (17),
US/uS is readily calculated as Seu/rREU. The optimal production subsidy










where = θ = Wu/WU. Equation (20) has an appealing interpretation. At
an optimum, an additional unit of exports reduces ￿rst-period spending by
S∗. In terms of overall welfare, the cost of this additional unit is E
−1
U WUS∗.
The learning-by-doing bene￿t appears in the second period, when output
rises by rR for each additional unit of ￿rst-period exports. Measured in
terms of overall welfare, the marginal bene￿ti se−1
u WurR. At an optimum
the marginal cost must equal the marginal bene￿t, which leads to equation
(20).6
To determine the eﬀect of alternative forms of transfer under the optimal
subsidy policy we endogenize S∗ by totally diﬀerentiating (20) which, under











The eﬀect of a transfer (dZ) on the margin is to increase the optimal subsidy
to exports. With WUU < 0, the receipt of temporary aid leads to a desire
to smooth spending across periods, and since the export subsidy is the only
inter-temporal linkage, this smoothing can only occur by creating additional
productivity spillovers into the future. Further eﬀects operate through the
channel emphasized in the static analysis, via the impact of the transfer on
dQ and dq: if the real exchange rate for imports appreciates in the ￿rst
period, this strengthens the tendency for S to rise; similarly if the real
exchange rate for exports appreciates in period 1, then (as we have seen) q
falls, encouraging a further rise in the subsidy.
Equations (16), (18) and (21) form a complete sub-system determining
dQ, dq,a n ddS∗ in terms of dA and dT which can be used to derive the
comparative statics of the model. Speci￿cally, the real appreciation caused
by the spending eﬀect of a transfer requires an oﬀsetting increase in the sub-
sidy to export production: this is true regardless of the form of the transfer.
6θ can be thought of as de￿ning an implicit domestic real interest rate r: θ =1+r.
If the recipient were able to borrow and lend at a ￿xed world interest rate r
∗,w ew o u l d
have EU/eu =( 1+r
∗)
−1 and therefore S
∗ = rR.A s i t i s , S
∗ >r R in (20) under the
assumption that the country is liquidity constrained so that the domestic real interest rate
exceeds the foreign interest rate.
8Tariﬀ preferences directly support exports, however, so the required increase
in the subsidy is smaller if the transfer comes as tariﬀ preferences. If the
demand-side substitution eﬀect arising from trade preferences is suﬃciently
strong in period 1 relative to inter-temporal substitution and the real income
eﬀect of the tariﬀ preferences, the optimum subsidy to exports actually falls
with an increase in tariﬀ preferences.
The asymmetries of the static analysis therefore carry over to the dy-
namic case. The transfer component of international grants or tariﬀ pref-
erences tends to undermine export competitiveness by appreciating the real
exchange rate for exports. Tariﬀ preferences, however, are unambiguously
better for developing country exports than pure grants. If exports are ￿spe-
cial￿ in the sense of delivering learning-by-doing externalities, an export
subsidy is called for to internalize these externalities. A rise in pure trans-
fers then requires an oﬀsetting rise in the export subsidy. If aid comes in
the form of tariﬀ preferences, the required increase in subsidies is smaller
and a reduction in subsidies may well be indicated.
Finally, we consider the eﬀect of alternative transfers on recipient-country
welfare. Diﬀerentiating W yields
dW = WUE−1
U dZ − WUE−1
U RXX(S − S∗)dT + WSdS (22)
When the optimum subsidy is in place, S − S∗ = WS =0a n dt h e￿nal two
terms on the right-hand side vanish and recipient country utility is invariant
to the form of the transfer. However, if the subsidy is below the optimal
levels (or is absent, so that dS = 0), the second term becomes strictly
positive (S − S∗ = −S∗ < 0) and tariﬀ preferences unambiguously deliver
higher welfare than the equivalent pure grant. Welfare eﬀects therefore
m i r r o rt h o s ei nt h es t a t i cc a s ep r o v i d e dt h eo p t i m a ls u b s i d yi si np l a c e .I f
it is not, a shift of aid from grants to tariﬀ preferences increases recipient-
country welfare.
4 Simulation Evidence
Our model has brought out some fundamental diﬀerences between aid and
trade. In particular we stressed that unless internalized by an optimal ex-
port subsidy dynamic eﬃciency gains arising from export externalities will
go unexploited. However, the model does not oﬀer a sense either of the
likely empirical importance of these diﬀerences for typical African countries
or of how robust the results are in the presence of structural characteris-
tics not included in the analytical model. Given data limitations and the
comprehensive changes in policy regimes in Africa in the last decade, robust
econometric estimation of export supply functions is likely to be fraught
with diﬃculties (although see Elbadawi (1999) for a promising attempt).
The alternative we pursue here is to simulate the eﬀects of aid and trade
9preferences in a more fully articulated version of our analytical model. For
this purpose we use a CGE model whose structure, while consistent with
our analytical model, is more sympathetic to the characteristics of many
low-income African countries. Simulation using this model allows us not
only to judge the empirical relevance of our analytical results but also to
test the robustness of these results to the inclusion of structural features
which otherwise would drastically complicate the analytical model.
We proceed as follows. Following a description of the basic features of the
model and simulation experiments, we develop a computable representation
of the model of Sections 2 and 3 in which factor endowments are ￿xed and
where the learning-by-doing spillover is the only inter-temporal linkage in the
economy (and where the export subsidy is ￿nanced via lump-sum taxation).
We then examine how these basic results are altered by introducing domestic
savings and investment (while retaining a closed private capital account) and
by limiting the scope for non-distortionary taxation.
4.1 Model Structure
We consider a four-sector economy (manufacturing, agriculture, private sec-
tor services and the government sector). The economy is assumed to be a
price taker for all tradable goods, but domestic goods and factor prices are
fully ￿exible. Domestic production and imports are imperfect substitutes
in consumption while gross output is imperfectly substitutable between do-
mestic and export markets. The composition of demand and supply is gov-
erned by homothetic constant elasticity of substitution (CES) and constant
elasticity of transformation (CET) functions respectively. Firms combine
intermediate goods and value-added to produce gross output according to
sector-speci￿cL e o n t i e f￿xed-coeﬃcients function. Value added is de￿ned
by sector-speci￿c Cobb-Douglas production functions exhibiting constant
returns to private factors but increasing returns in the presence of public
infrastructure capital. This type of model is widely used in analyzing trade
policy in small open economies (see, for example, Devarajan et al, 1993).









where β is the discount rate, v(ch)=u(ch)XαG
pub, u(ch)d e ￿nes the utility from
private market consumption (de￿ned by a CES linear expenditure system)
and Xpub is the level of recurrent government output (αG is the weight of
government output in private welfare). In the simulations considered below
we take the limiting case of ε = 1 so that the term in square brackets is
ln(v(ch)).
10In the simplest version of the model, sector-speci￿c capital stocks are
￿xed both in the long- and short run and capital does not depreciate.
Labour, which is homogeneous and fully employed, is mobile across sec-
tors. In the extended version, the capital stocks depreciate over time and
gross investment responds to equalize sectoral returns to capital. Aid is de-
￿ned as unrequited and untied grant-in-aid transfers. With a closed private
capital account there is no private net accumulation of foreign assets and
oﬃcial reserves are assumed to be constant: hence domestic relative prices
adjust to satisfy the balance of payments constraint.
The government sector diﬀers substantially between the two versions of
the model. In the simple version, the government acts only as a conduit,
transferring aid to the private sector. The ￿scal de￿cit/surplus after grants is
transferred to the private sector through lump-sum taxes or rebates. These
functions are carried out without consuming resources. The public capital
stock in the simple model is ￿x e di np e r p e t u i t y .I nt h ee x t e n d e dv e r s i o n ,t h e
government levies taxes (on consumption and income) to fund the export
subsidy, to meet recurrent expenditure, and to maintain the public capital
stock. In this instance, taxes may be either lump-sum or distortionary.
The model is recursively dynamic. In the basic model with ￿xed fac-
tor endowments the only inter-temporal linkage is the spillover externality
operating directly on the production function for manufactured goods. We
represent this as a Hicks-neutral technological innovation. Production func-





where L denotes labour, K private capital, Kg public capital, and t time,
where αLi + αKi = 1 and αGi ≥ 0. For the non spillover sectors Ait = Ai



















is the (discounted) sum of exports in the spillover sector up to and including
t−1 under the simulation experiment, and ﬂ E
p
t is the correspondingly de￿ned
cumulative exports under the baseline trajectory for the economy. φ ≥
0 measures the extent of the spillover, and 0 < γ < ∞ is the discount
factor. The evolution of productivity in this sector is therefore governed
by the cumulative level of exports, the discount factor, and the spillover
parameter. To ensure that the simulation model converges to a new steady
11state following a temporary policy experiment, (25) is parameterized as






where As0 is the value of Ast at the baseline calibration. A number of
features may be noted here. First, the higher is γ t h em o r er a p i d l yp a s t
experience depreciates in determining current productivity, and the smaller
and less persistent is the impact of a temporary change in the level of ex-
ports. Second, since γ is ￿n i t et h e r ew i l la l w a y sb es o m ep e r s i s t e n c ei n ¡Ep
ﬂ Ep
¢
. Temporary policy reforms will therefore have at least some perma-
nent consequence for productivity. Third, the speci￿cation is symmetric:
thus anything that reduces export volumes relative to the baseline will also
depress sectoral productivity, although this may eventually be reversed by
subsequent policy action or through other processes, such as capital accu-
mulation, which lead to increased exports. Finally, since there is virtually
no empirical literature that would allow us to calibrate the parameters φ
and γ, parameter values were selected to ensure that the system arrives at
a new steady state within a ￿reasonable￿ time-period following a temporary
experiment (see below).7
In the extended model inter-temporal eﬀects also operate through sav-
ings and investment. The simulations reported below assume a standard
neo-classical closure: investment is savings-driven and households maintain
a ￿xed savings rate independent of the average domestic return on capital,
although the distribution of investment is determined by sectoral rates of
return.8
4.2 Calibration and Experiment Design
Appendix Table 1 summarizes the baseline data and behavioural parameters
with which the model is calibrated. With zero growth in the labour supply
and net investment equal to zero (in both public and private sectors) the
baseline calibration represents a steady-state equilibrium in which sectoral
returns on capital are equalized. The spillover sector, denoted ￿Manufactur-
ing￿ consisting of manufacturing and agro-processing industries, is the larger
7Note that the spill-over is de￿ned in terms of exports rather than total production.
Thus, for example, a change in relative prices that skews the supply of manufactured goods
towards the domestic market would reduce the externality even though total output may
increasing. Under the chosen calibration, however, this possibility is limited since the spill-
over sector is a net exporter and domestic consumption of manufactured goods is almost
entirely in terms of intermediate goods which are characterised by a low price elasticity
of substitution.
8Although the model is not explicitly forward-looking we assume that agents know
the policy change is temporary and hence their savings decisions respond accordingly.
Thus they alter their savings in response to the ￿windfall￿ income gains generated by the
temporary resource transfer in order to smooth their consumption over time.
12of the two net export sectors. It is also the most capital intensive activity
in the economy. Gross private investment is partially ￿nanced from domes-
tic savings, but predominantly from foreign aid (net of amortization) which
represent approximately 11% of GDP. Total revenue is approximately 20%
of GDP which generates a domestic current budget surplus of 4% of GDP,
suﬃcient to maintain the public capital stock at its steady-state level.
The values chosen for the behavioural parameters re￿ect common prac-
tise in similar CGE models applied to low income developing countries.9 In
general elasticities of substitution in consumption and production are set
low. In particular, we assume that for all sectors the price elasticity of sub-
stitution in consumption is less than unity. Hence, the income eﬀect of a
terms of trade change will outweigh the substitution eﬀect implying that the
import real exchange rate will appreciate (depreciate) following a positive
(negative) change in the sectoral terms of trade.
We consider two variants of our aid versus trade experiment. The ￿rst,
which closely follows the analytical model, considers a ￿temporary￿ increase
in the resource ￿ow from the donor eﬀe c t e de i t h e ra sa ni n c r e a s ei na i do r
a change in trade preferences (denoted by a change in the exogenous world
price faced by the recipient country) or some combination of the two. How-
ever con￿gured, the initial cost to the donor is equivalent to a 10% decrease
in the tariﬀ, T, on the recipient country￿s exports. Second, we examine a
￿resource neutral￿ experiment in which the donor￿s baseline resource trans-
fer is converted at the margin from a grant ￿ow to a trade preference. We
refer to this as the ￿trade-for-aid￿ experiment. In contrast to the other ex-
periments, the trade-for-aid experiment avoids any unrealistic assumption of
ar i s ei no v e r a l lr e s o u r c e￿ows from donors. Moreover, since the donor￿s op-
portunity cost is zero by construction in this experiment, the welfare impact
on the recipient provides a test of eﬃciency in the baseline con￿guration of
foreign assistance. In all cases the resource ￿ow, or the switch from aid to
trade preferences, is assumed to be temporary.
A central question at this point is how we de￿ne ￿donor-equivalence￿
between aid and trade preferences. In Section 2 we assumed that equiv-
alence could be de￿ned as the tariﬀ r e v e n u el o s ta tt h eoriginal export
volume, which necessarily ignores the donor￿s revenue loss on any expan-
sion of exports from the preference-receiving country. Since the analytical
model restricts its attention to marginal changes in aid and preferences this
is appropriate, but if we focus on non-marginal changes we need to de￿ne
equivalence in terms of the full revenue loss allowing for the export response.
The relevant donor budget constraint in the face of non-marginal transfers
is thus
dZ = dA +[1+(τ + dT)σXX]RXdT (28)
where τ is the initial tariﬀ preference (assumed to be zero in the simula-
9For example Collange and Cogneau (1999) and Davies et al (1998).
13tions), dT is the increase in the trade preference, and σXX is the recipient￿s
elasticity of export supply. Equation (6) in Section 2 clearly overstates the
size of the donor-equivalent trade preferences that a reduction in aid can
buy, by an amount σXXRXdT2. In the simulations, therefore, we use (28)
as the basis for donor equivalence.
Even (28), of course, provides only a partial equilibrium approximation
to the general equilibrium response of exports to changes in trade prefer-
ences. Exports respond in equilibrium to movements in domestic goods￿
prices or real wages, and to productivity spillovers and capital formation.
Particularly for non-marginal changes, the net eﬀect of these general equi-
librium interactions may be poorly approximated by σXXRX. In the sim-
ulations below, we explicitly compute the ex post deviation from revenue-
neutrality in our experiments.
It is important to note that any nontrivial expansion of African exports
creates a trade-diversion loss for the donor and recipient considered jointly.
The problem is that a portion of the donor￿s revenue loss accrues not as
producers￿ surplus for the recipient but as compensation for the additional
real resources devoted to export production.10 In the absence of spillovers
from additional exporting, this resource cost tilts the eﬃciency calculation
against trade preferences. As we shall see, however, reasonably parameter-
ized spillover eﬀects overwhelm this trade diversion cost.
The timing of event is as follows. Calibration occurs at time t =0 .P e -
riod t = 1 commences with the implementation of the experiment consisting
of a change in the exogenous world price for manufactured exports, a change
in the exogenous level of aid, or both. Changes in the baseline tax or subsidy
rates are also implemented at this point. The model is then solved to gener-
ate the short-run equilibrium conditional on the existing capital stock. The
short-run equilibrium solution includes new saving and investment vectors
and the spillover-induced changes in the productivity in the spillover sector,
if relevant. The new capital stock and productivity parameters are embod-
ied between periods t =1a n dt = 2 and the model is re-solved conditional
on these values. This is repeated until t = 5. For the remainder of the
run all exogenous variables are returned to their baseline values so that the
evolution of the economy is determined exclusively by the interaction of the
cumulative change in productivity, the capital stock, and the ￿scal stance
of government. The model is re-solved until a new steady state is achieved.
For all the experiments, given the spillover parameters, the economy returns
to a steady state between t =1 0a n dt = 25 depending on the spillover pa-
rameters. In the tables reported in the next section we report the evolution
of the economy on impact (t = 1), at the end of the temporary experiment
(t = 5) and at the new steady state (t =2 5 ) .
10We refer to the loss as a trade diversion loss because the opportunity cost of the
increased African exports is above the world price by the preference margin dT.
144.3 Results
4.3.1 The Basic Model
No Export Spillovers. We start by describing the results from the most
basic model with ￿xed factor endowments, lump-sum taxation and no spillover
externality. The purpose is to con￿rm the insights of the analytical model
and to establish some baseline orders of magnitude. Table 1 reports these
results. Since there are no inter-temporal linkages in this version, either
through spillover eﬀects or savings and investment, the economy necessarily
returns to its steady-state baseline con￿guration after the end of the ex-
periment (i.e. from t = 5 onwards), a feature unique to this set of results.
Nonetheless, the movements in prices and quantities are as predicted in Sec-
tion 2. The resource-pull eﬀect of trade preferences - where the growth of
exports draws resources out of the non-tradable sector ￿ leads to a greater
appreciation of the import real exchange rate (QM) than under a pure aid
transfer, while the switch from aid to trade lowers the appreciation of the
export real exchange rate (QX). In fact, given the elasticities of substitu-
tion used in these experiments, the substitution eﬀect is suﬃciently strong
that we observe a depreciation in the export real exchange rate when the
resource ￿ow is solely through trade preferences. Similar results can be seen
in column [4] where we have neutralized the income eﬀect of the transfer
by considering the resource neutral switch from aid to trade. In this case,
unencumbered by the income eﬀect, we observe a larger real exchange rate
depreciation for exports and a milder appreciation of the import real ex-
change rate than under the trade-only case.
The evolution of output and consumption follows directly. Resources
transferred by way of aid reduce manufactured exports and total domestic
output. Falling net exports, sustained by the appreciation of the import
and export real exchange rates, facilitate the rise in domestic consump-
tion. However, as trade preferences dominate the resource transfer so total
output and consumption rise. Finally, since capital stocks are ￿xed over
time, the composition of the resource transfer will have diﬀerential eﬀects
of real wages and pro￿t rates. In the long run, given constant capital stocks
and the absence of spillovers, steady state wages and the return on capital
are unchanged. For the duration of the experiment, however, real wages
increase but by a greater amount when the transfer comes through trade
preferences, as ￿rms in the expanding sector bid up average real wages in
order to increase supply in the face of a ￿xed capital stock.
We turn next to the question of equivalence. In contrast with the the-
oretical model, neither donor nor recipient is indiﬀerent as to the form of
assistance. On the donor side, exact revenue equivalence falls due to the gen-
eral equilibrium interactions discussed earlier. In the trade-only scenario,
the general equilibrium elasticity of exports is lower than the partial equi-
15librium one built into our ex ante revenue-equivalence calculation (equation
(28)), with the result that the ex post cost of the tariﬀ preference is some
4% lower than the ex ante cost over the lifetime of the experiment. In
the trade-for-aid case, in contrast, the pure transfer component is absent
and upward pressure on domestic prices is moderated; the naive calculation
mow understates the full cost of trade preferences for the donor, but only
marginally. Diﬀerences are of course more striking from the recipient￿s per-
spective, since the welfare gain associated with trade is net of the domestic
resource cost of what proves to be a non-marginal increase in exports. In
column [5], denoted ￿exact aid￿, we recompute the aid ￿ow that would be
required to compensate the recipient fully for additional costs of export pro-
duction under the trade preference. For the calibration used here, aid ￿ows
would have to be 6.8% higher. In this static model, therefore the resource
costs associated with non-marginal expansion of exports shifts the balance
in favour of aid over trade. We now introduce learning-by-doing spillovers
and export subsidies into the model.
The Basic Model with Export Spillovers The inter-temporal eﬀect
of the spillover ensures that the economy converges to a new steady state
characterized by permanently higher or lower exports and output, and sus-
taining higher or lower factor incomes, consumption and welfare (Table 2).
Consider ￿rst the ￿trade only￿ experiment in columns [2a] and [2b]. Com-
pared with column [3] of Table 1, the spillover permanently raises exports
by around 3% in the case of the moderate spillover and as much as 12% in
the case of the high spillover, contributing to permanently higher output of
between 1.4% and 6% and an increase in welfare of between 2.9% and 3.9%.
By contrast in the ￿aid only￿ case (columns[1a] and [1b]) the initial crowding
out of exports through the real exchange rate appreciation triggers a decline
in total factor productivity in that sector and thus a further deterioration of
export production and output. This decline feeds into falling real wages and
pro￿ts and results in signi￿cantly lower consumption and welfare. In fact,
despite the size of the initial resource transfer, the permanent impact on
welfare is only just positive in the high-spillover case and full 2% lower than
the case analyzed in Table 1. In this scenario, the lower spillover ￿protects￿
the economy more from the adverse eﬀects arising from the grant in￿ow,
limiting the output decline to one quarter of the decline experienced in the
high-spillover case.
Turning to the ￿trade for aid￿ case (columns [3a] and [3b]) we note that
the long-run response of exports and output is greater than under the trade
only case for any given level of the spillover parameter (even though the trade
preference is only 5% of the baseline price). This diﬀerence simply re￿ects
the absence of the counteracting ￿drag￿ on the export sector generated by
the pure transfer component of the trade preference. Notice also that this
16time the donor￿s naive calculation of equivalence signi￿cantly understates
t h et r u ec o s to ft h ep o l i c ys w i t c h :b yv i r t u eo ft h es p i l l o v e ra n dt h ea b s e n c e
of a net increase in resources the crowding-out of the export response noted
above is substantially diminished so that in fact the cost of ￿nancing the
transfer (over the lifetime of the experiment) is approximately 1% larger
than the ￿savings￿ on aid). To the extent that the trade-for-aid experiment
neutralizes the income eﬀect of the transfer, this experiment gives us the key
benchmark for the gains accruing to a change in aid policy. The eﬀects are
sizeable with long-run per capita real consumption and welfare increasing
by 4% and 2% respectively as a result of the temporary policy switch.
The model of Section 2 derived the optimal subsidy and showed that
it leaves consumers indiﬀerent (in a welfare sense) between aid or trade.
Columns [4a] and [4b] illustrate the case were the recipient to use part of
the grant aid in￿ow to fund an export subsidy just suﬃcient to replicate
the long-run welfare consequences prevailing under the trade-only scenario.
The export subsidy acts to neutralize the income eﬀect of the aid transfer
on the export real exchange rate so that the sector is able to still garner the
bene￿ts of the spillover externality.11
To brie￿y summarize, the results of Table 2 indicate that even in the case
of a simple endowment economy with export induced productivity spillovers,
the gains from a shift from aid to trade are substantial. At the margin, the
simulation results imply a short-run export real exchange rate elasticity with
respect to a switch from aid to trade is approximately 0.25, and the corre-
sponding supply response in the region of 0.3 to 0.4. The price elasticities
are somewhat lower than van Wijnbergen￿s (1985) point estimates of 0.84
based on Kenyan data for the 1980s, and the supply elasticities lie at the
lower end of the estimates derived by Sekkat and Varoudakis (2000) for a
panel of African economies over the period 1970-1992. Our relatively low
elasticities are not altogether surprising given the maintained assumption
that the economy￿s factor supplies are ￿xed and fully employed. In the next
section we therefore relax this assumption.
11Since the simulations are based on open preferences, the dynamic evolution of the
economy in the two cases will diﬀer slightly. In the ￿trade only￿ case the full cost of
the preference is borne by the donor (i.e. the transfer on the initial level of exports
plus the preference granted on the additional exports). By contrast, in the ￿aid cum
subsidy￿ case the aid ￿ow is equivalent to the transfer on the initial level of exports only,
with the cost of the subsidy on the additional exports ￿nanced from domestic resources.
Because we assume that the government has access to lump-sum taxation, however, the
welfare consequences are negligible. Nonetheless, since the changed ￿scal balance alters
the evolution of the domestic price PD, the import and export real exchange rates are
slightly diﬀerent relative to their values in the ￿trade only￿ case in transition to the new
steady state.
174.3.2 The Extended Model
We now examine how these basic results are modi￿ed when we allow for
private and public sector capital formation. Maintaining a closed private
capital account we assume that private sector saving is used to accumulate
domestic physical capital. The private sector has a ￿xed baseline propen-
sity to save but we assume that it correctly recognizes the resource transfer
to be temporary. Hence the saving rate on the ￿windfall￿ resource transfer
rises to smooth consumption over the simulation horizon. Private saving
determines total private investment while its sectoral distribution is deter-
mined by sector-speci￿c marginal products of capital. As noted above, the
importance of government capital formation in this model resides in its role
in augmenting the total return to private factors (see equation (24)). We
consider two alternative scenarios, the ￿rst of which assumes that the gov-
ernment ￿nances a constant public capital stock from lump-sum taxation.
By contrast, the second scenario assumes that the government is constrained
in its use of lump-sum taxation so that the opportunity cost of an export
subsidy is represented by a decline in investment in public capital formation.
These extensions necessarily widen the parameter space for our simulations
and in order to avoid a proliferation of results we proceed in two steps,
starting with an examination of the eﬀect of introducing private sector sav-
ing and investment assuming lump-sum taxation before concluding with a
discussion of the results under distortionary taxation.
T h er e s u l t so fs i m u l a t i n gt h ee x t e n d e dm o d e la r er e p o r t e di nT a b l e3 .
In both cases the baseline model has been re-calibrated relative to Tables 1
and 2 to optimize the baseline export subsidy on manufactured exports in
line with equation (20). For the low spillover the optimal subsidy is 10%
of the (baseline) world export price while for the high spillover the optimal
subsidy is 15%.12
Private Capital Accumulation Introducing capital markets has impor-
tant consequences for the dynamic behaviour of the economy by endowing
the model with a second inter-temporal linkage. The principal implication
of this extension is that the model with savings and investment is capable
of magnifying the welfare gains, and moderating the losses, observed in the
endowment model. When agents save in response to a temporary resource
transfer, part of the income gain is diverted to capital formation which, given
the ￿xed labour endowment, raises the economy-wide value of the marginal
product of labour, the level of output, and welfare. This investment-induced
eﬀect stimulates the export spillover externality independently of any rela-
tive price eﬀect, and hence creates the possibility of a virtuous circle - with
export growth feeding additional capital formation (which is biased towards
12Details on the baseline calibrations are available on request from the corresponding
author.
18the spillover sector) which further stimulates productivity in the spillover
sector. By contrast, in the aid-only case positive investment-induced ef-
fects serve to mitigate the adverse relative price eﬀects observed in Table 2.
For example, with a high spillover, a trade-only resource transfer leads to a
permanent increase in the capital stock of 7% (Column [2b]), permanently
higher real wages and pro￿ts, and an output level 15% higher than the base-
line. Together these contribute to an increase in welfare in the long run in
excess of 16%, approximately 12% higher than the comparable outturn in
Table 2. In the aid-only case, real output falls by 4.7% as opposed to 8.1%
in the endowment economy, contributing to a long-run increase in welfare
of 4% (as opposed to zero).13
The combined eﬀect of the export spillover and capital accumulation
means that the donor cost of trade preferences is markedly higher with the
simple equivalence calculation understating the true cost of trade preferences
by between 10% and 16% over the ￿ve-year experiment. However, even if
the donor is assumed to fully internalize this cost, the qualitative nature
of the results is unchanged and the switch from aid to trade still increases
welfare.
A second, but much less powerful, eﬀect introduced in the extended
model arises from the composition of expenditure. In the data used here,
which are broadly representative of many low income African economies,
capital expenditure is slightly more intensive in non-tradable goods than is
consumption. As a consequence, a switch from consumption to investment
expenditure at the margin will tend to appreciate the consumption real ex-
change rate. Although the eﬀect is mild in this model, in principle given
that foreign asset accumulation is not possible, if this composition eﬀect is
strong enough, high short run saving could be inimical to spillover-based
growth for the standard ￿construction boom￿ reasons. Clearly in circum-
stances where capital expenditure is heavily skewed towards tradable goods
the reverse may be expected.
Columns [4a] and [4b] in Table 3 illustrate the gains that could accrue
in circumstances where, for whatever reason, there is no export subsidy
present in the baseline. In this case since the economy has not already
internalized the spillover externality, the output and welfare gains from a
switch in the form of resource transfer at the margin are correspondingly
larger than those shown in Columns [3a] and [3b]. Importantly however, as is
seen from the lower panel of Table 3, the ￿scal consequences diﬀer markedly.
In the presence of an export subsidy a switch from aid to trade necessarily
13The strength of the capital accumulation eﬀect necessarily re￿ects the closure rule
adopted and in particular the assumption that the private sector￿s propensity to save rises
in response to the temporary resource transfer so that short-run investment eﬀects are
quite powerful. It follows therefore that as the short-term savings response weakens (for
example if no attempt is made to smooth consumption) the eﬀect of the spillover weakens
correspondingly.
19raises the cost of the subsidy and has a deleterious eﬀect of the overall ￿scal
balance, both absolutely and relative to the case where there is no subsidy
in place. Rather naturally, the cost to the donor is also correspondingly
higher. In the latter case, with no subsidy, the trade for aid switch improves
the ￿scal balance principally as a results of the growth in the economy￿s tax
base.14
In either case, however, we assume that changes in the overall ￿scal
balance are ￿nanced by changes in non-distortionary lump-sum transfer to
or from the private sector. In the ￿nal section we therefore consider the
implications for changes in the form of the resource transfer when access to
lump-sum taxation is limited.
Fiscal Eﬀects The domestic ￿scal consequences of the experiments can
be separated into two components (see bottom panel of Table 3). The direct
￿scal eﬀe c t-p i c k e du pi nt h ea n a l y t i c a lm o d e l-r e ￿ects the change in the
value of export subsidies brought about by the change in the volume (and
domestic price) of manufactured exports. Export subsidies rise in line with
the growth of manufacturing exports, and therefore higher trade preferences
a r ea s s oci a t e dw it haw o r s e n in g￿scal balance, ceteris paribus. This increased
direct ￿scal cost may, however, be oﬀset by revenue gains from other taxes
accruing from the initial income transfer (whether by aid or by trade) and, in
the presence of spillovers, by subsequent growth in the total tax base. These
actual magnitude of these indirect eﬀects re￿e c tan u m b e ro ff e a t u r e so ft h e
calibration. First the calibration assumes that imports and non-tradable
goods attract indirect taxes while exports do not, so that an increase in net
exports will reduce the tax base, ceteris paribus.T h i si sa c c e n t u a t e db yt h e
fact that the import real exchange rate appreciation is greater under trade
preferences which reduces the value of ad valorem trade taxes expressed in
units of GDP. Taken together these eﬀect mean that total revenue rises more
slowly than GDP in response to a switch from aid to trade. Finally, it is
ambiguous whether the cost of government expenditure should rise or fall
since it depends its composition relative to that of GDP. The calibration
used here assumes government expenditure to be intensive in non-tradables
so that an appreciation of the (import) real exchange rate reduces the cost
of government expenditure when measured in units of GDP.
Taking these factors together, reallocating support from aid to trade
at the margin in the presence of the optimal export subsidy worsens the
net ￿scal balance as the increased direct cost of the subsidy outweighs the
indirect ￿scal gains from growth, particularly when there is a high spillover
14In both cases, the real volume of govenment expenditure and the structure of taxation
is ￿xed at their baseline values. Thus the govenment is not assumed to re-optimize its
tax structure as the economy grows so that the changes in the ￿scal balance re￿ect the
change in total revenue (inclusive of the export subsidy) and the change in the cost of
government expenditure given the change in relative prices.
20(see columns [3a] and [3b]). Hence the government must raise additional
revenue to ￿nance the subsidy. Since the resource ￿ow accrues in the ￿rst
instance to the private sector through higher export prices, the government
must tax away from the private sector some of the pure transfer component
of the resource transfer in order to ￿nance the net cost of the export subsidy,
and thus the question of potential tax distortions arises. In the presence
of lump-sum taxation this does not undermine the welfare eﬀects of the
resource switch, but will do when recourse to non-distortionary taxation is
not possible.
To illustrate the phenomenon we consider a very simple characterization
that assumes that the quantity of government consumption (and thus factor
demands) remains constant. To introduce a relevant distortion we assume
that the extra cost of the subsidy falls on the ability of the public sector to
maintain the level of public capital formation.15 This scenario is reported
in columns [5a] and [5b] of Table 3. Initially the eﬀects are similar, but
since public capital formation competes directly with export subsidies for a
share of the (￿xed) expenditure vote, the new long-run equilibrium is char-
acterized by a lower public capital stock. Given its externality for private
productivity, this lowers the return on private capital, output growth and
hence welfare. The gains from a switch from aid to trade are still positive
but when the spillover and private capital accumulation eﬀects con￿ict with
an oﬀsetting ￿scal distortion these eﬀects are necessarily less powerful. In-
deed, with a suﬃciently large latent ￿scal distortion we could reverse the
presumption in favour of trade at the margin since a pure aid transfer would
allow the authorities the ability to eliminate the binding growth-restraining
￿scal distortion even at the cost of blunting the incentive to access the
export-generated spillover.
4.4 Simulation Model: Summary
The simulations presented in this section con￿rm the insights of the ana-
lytical model but suggest some important extensions. As predicted by the
model, the form in which foreign transfers are provided aﬀects the recip-
ient￿s export incentives. Open preferences drive exports up; grants drive
exports down. This asymmetry holds even when major portions of tem-
porary grant ￿nancing are saved, as in our simulations. The mechanism
is straightforward: the long-run real exchange rate for exports is nearly 17
percentage points more depreciated, in our experiments (Table 3), when a
15The same distortion could be achieved by assuming that the government could only
increase subsidies by increasing other distortionary taxes. However since the model does
not explicitly embody a household labour supply decision (i.e. there is no valuation of
lesiure) and since all goods are subject touniformand linear tax schedulesthetaxstructure
in this model is, in fact, non-distortionary and buoyant. The rather crude mechanism
adopted here at least has the virtue that it approximates the second-best problem facing
government seeking to accommodate higher export subsidies.
21third of temporary aid comes in the form of trade preferences than when it
comes entirely as donor-equivalent grants. The key here is not whether aid
is spent or saved, because in either case a temporary aid ￿ow creates a boom
in the nontraded goods market (driven, in the latter case, by the nontraded
component of investment).16 The key, instead, is that trade preferences raise
export prices while grants leave them unchanged.
In the absence of spillovers, or when spillovers are appropriately inter-
nalized via an export subsidy, the recipient is indiﬀerent to a small change
in the composition of transfers received. Our simulations suggest, however,
that there is considerably more at stake in practice. First, the recipient is
not indiﬀerent to non-marginal changes. Even with modest export spillovers
(suﬃcient to justify a 10 percent subsidy in the initial equilibrium), shifting
a third of the aid budget for a period of 5 years, while holding the export sub-
sidy rate constant, increases the recipient￿s permanent income by 2 percent
Table 2 (column 3a). If spillovers are suﬃcient to justify a 15 percent initial
subsidy, this impact increases to 5.4 percent (Table 3 column 3c). Second,
the non-marginal nature of the changes appears to be more important quan-
titatively than the question of whether the recipient has an optimal subsidy
in place. The impact of a trade-for-aid shift is indeed larger if learning-by-
doing externalities are not initially internalized, but for non-marginal shifts
o ft h es i z ew ea r ec o n s i d e r i n g ,t h ed i ﬀerence is relatively small: a gain of 6
percent rather than 5.4 percent in the high-spillover case.
Our simulations incorporate private capital accumulation and also a ￿s-
cal distortion, two features that were absent from the theoretical model. The
impact of these extensions accords with intuition. Incorporating investment
allows the transfer component of aid to generate positive spillovers via the
eﬀect of capital accumulation on manufacturing exports. This enhances the
welfare eﬀect of donor support, whether it comes in the form of grants or
trade preferences, by mitigating the adverse eﬀects of pure grants and aug-
menting the spillover eﬀect of preferences. It also strengthens the argument
for trade over aid, because preferences now generate even stronger spillovers
by drawing investment into the manufacturing sector. Fiscal distortions,
in contrast, reduce the attractiveness of preferences relative to grants. The
reason is that with a ￿xed export subsidy rate, the export expansion that
accompanies a shift from aid to trade creates a ￿scal burden. Revenues must
be raised, or (as in our case) productive spending decreased, to ￿nance the
increased subsidies. The welfare cost of this ￿scal adjustment - which would
be zero if lump-sum taxation were available - reduces the relative attractive-
ness of preferences. In our simulations a donor-equivalent shift from aid to
trade remains bene￿cial for the recipient, but this result could be reversed
16Recall that the capital account is closed. If it were open, a portion of domestic saving
would be used to accumulate foreign assets, limiting the boom in the domestic non-traded
goods market.
22if ￿scal distortions were suﬃciently strong relative to export spillovers.
5 Conclusions
The analysis in the previous sections raises an obvious question: if open
trade preferences are more eﬃcient than aid, what explains the coexistence
during the GATT/WTO era of large aid ￿ows with restrictions on developing
country exports into industrial country markets through the operation of a
system of closed preferences? In this ￿nal section we consider why these
gains have been left unexploited.
Note ￿rst that the thrust of our analysis continues to hold if learning-
by-doing externalities are associated with imports rather than with man-
ufactured exports or with the production of traded manufactured goods
more generally. Helleiner (1990), for example, suggests that productivity
spillovers are associated primarily with noncompetitive imports of diﬀeren-
tiated inputs, a theme that has been developed in the endogenous growth
literature (e.g., Bayoumi, Coe and Helpman, 1999). The notion here is that
gains in total factor productivity accrue in industrial countries and are em-
bodied in their exports, which then are used in the accumulation of human
and physical capital in the recipient country. Of course, if growth-enhancing
spillovers are attached to imports rather than to exports, then the transfer
component of aid is no longer at odds with their capture. A larger transfer
enhances import capacity, because the induced real appreciation exerts only
a second-order eﬀect. Spillovers rise rather than falling, and the case for an
active subsidy (in this case, to imports) is weakened rather than enhanced
as a function of aid volume. But our main argument relates to the form of
aid, not to its overall amount. From this perspective, the key insight is that
a shift from grants to donor-equivalent preferences also increases the recip-
ient￿s import capacity, by generating new exports. By arguments similar to
those employed above, such a switch increases the recipient￿s welfare even if
spillovers occur solely on the import side.
Surely the deeper reasons for unexploited gains lie in distributional con-
siderations that we have omitted from the formal model. These considera-
tions raise both the supply of aid and the demand for aid, relative to trade
preferences. On the supply side, industrial countries routinely discriminate
against imports from developing countries in order to protect domestic pro-
ducers, particularly in the textile, clothing and agricultural sectors (in the
latter case, via export subsidies). Shifting a dollar of assistance from grants
to greater market access would produce an eﬃciency gain for industrial coun-
tries, saving taxpayers slightly more in aggregate than is lost by workers and
￿rms in the protected sectors. But the losses are highly concentrated and,
as was borne out at the Seattle meetings of the WTO in 1999, are able to
mobilize greater political support. The supply of market access is therefore
23low relative to the supply of grants or grant-equivalents. The same consider-
ations produce a preference among donors for closed over open preferences,
and for preferences on temperate zone exports over manufactured exports,
since the former do not compete directly with domestic production. A tariﬀ
concession on a product line already covered by a quantitative export limit
is the equivalent of a pure grant: exports cannot rise. An open preference on
temperate zone exports allows exports to rise, but since these exports are
not typically associated with learning-by-doing eﬀects this generates wel-
fare gains only if it is import capacity, rather than exports, that generates
spillovers.
Distributional eﬀects on the demand-side may also be important. The
key here is that aid is an oﬃcial transaction, while the direct bene￿ts of
market access are diﬀused across the private sector. The form of assistance
therefore has a ￿rst-order eﬀect on the distribution of income between the
public and private sectors in the receiving economy. In discussing the im-
pact of ￿scal distortions we suggested above what amounts to a normative
argument for aid over trade. The idea is that domestic revenue collection
is distortionary and also that export subsidies are only one of a number
of attractive public projects. For example, it might be socially optimal to
spend half of a temporary aid increase on export subsidies and half on pub-
lic infrastructure. These plans can be carried out costlessly if aid comes
as a grant to the government. But if it comes as trade preferences, the
portion that is channeled into infrastructure must be ￿nanced by higher
taxes. In this case, the non-fungibility of trade-generated resources imposes
a social cost, and the recipient is better oﬀ with a donor-equivalent grant.
The underlying point is familiar from the public ￿nance literature: absent
diﬀerences in preferences between donor and recipient, fungible grants are
likely to preferable on eﬃciency grounds to non-fungible ones.
As on the supply side, however, positive considerations are probably
more decisive than normative ones in raising the demand for aid relative to
trade. A governing elite concerned with its own continuation in power is
likely to place a signi￿cantly higher value on public sector resources than
would a representative consumer. Lacking the ability to tax away private
incomes, such a government will prefer grants over donor-equivalent pref-
erences even in the face of signi￿cant eﬃciency losses. Where constraints
on executive authority are weak, the preferences of the elite will be deci-
sive and the eﬀective demand for market access will be weak relative to the
demand for aid. And once the pattern of assistance is established, the fa-
miliar status-quo bias supports its persistence: aid bene￿ciaries, both inside
and outside the public sector, form a coherent lobby capable of defeating
the diﬀuse and uncertain group of potential winners from a donor-equivalent
shift to market access. These considerations are of course not decisive; elites
can be strongly committed to private sector development, as in Mauritius
or Botswana. But Ake (1996), Mkandawire and Soludo (1999) and others
24suggest that such elites were relatively unlikely to emerge in the political
environment of post-independence Africa.
We have argued that distributional considerations explain the failure of
donors and recipients to unlock the dynamic gains to a shift from aid to
trade. For the countries of Africa, we should perhaps go further and argue
that it is ultimately the domestic politics that count. The point is that
when preferences are open - so that quantitative restrictions, if any, are not
binding - recipients can unilaterally mimic a donor-equivalent shift from aid
to trade by using aid in￿o w st op a ye x p o r ts u b s i d i e st od o m e s t i cp r o d u c -
ers. This strategy is not open to middle-income aid recipients, because the
manufactured exports of these countries typically face quantitative restric-
tions. Nor will it be a possibility after some of these restrictions (including
those of the long-standing Multi-Fiber Arrangement) have been removed
as a result of the Uruguay Round, because the new WTO restrictions on
export subsidization will prevent an aggressive export response. But with
few exceptions, the manufactured exports of low-income developing coun-
tries - a category that includes most African countries - have not been large
enough to attract quantitative restrictions. Although evidence suggests that
such restrictions will emerge endogenously if exports rise substantially, if our
analysis is correct, aid recipients should shift fungible aid resources into the
promotion of exports. Donors skeptical of the intentions or political resolve
of recipient governments should do this unilaterally.
The analysis in this paper strengthens the case for open trade preferences
over aid. The period since the mid-1980s has seen the industrial countries
trading aid for import liberalization by African countries while trading recip-
rocal trade concessions with other developing countries. While aid to Africa
has primarily been thought of as trade-promoting, this paper has empha-
sized a direct and adverse eﬀect operating through export competitiveness.
In contrast to pure grants, transfers in the form of open trade preferences
have an intrinsically export-promoting dimension. Any logic that sees ex-
ports as an engine of growth therefore leads to a strong concern for the form
of aid.
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6 Appendix: The optimum subsidy
To simplify and interpret the resulting expression we assume: (i) the social welfare
function is additively separable in U and u so that WUu =0 ;(ii) that EUU =
euu =0which holds if E(Q,1,U) can be expressed as E = f(Q,1)U ;a n d( i i i )
the production shift associated with higher ￿rst-period exports is linear, so that
rRR =0 . To start with note that S =( EU/eu)rR. Totally diﬀerentiating and


















This is straightforward except for the term dθ. Since θ = Wu/WU,w eh a v e













Equation (A2) is potentially complicated because dU and du each depend on dA,
dT and dS.B u tt h e￿rst term vanishes if we assume that the utility function, W












Recalling that the ￿rst-order condition for S requires θ = −US/uS,i ti sc l e a rf r o m
inspection of (15) and (17) that the term dU +θdu involves only the direct eﬀects
of dA and dT in equation (15) (i.e., dQ and dS cancel out). The ￿nal term in du,
in contrast, involves both dQ and dS; but this term drops out of (A5) if S is small.
In particular, substituting equations (15) and (17) into (A7) and then substituting











2)( A 4 )
The notation o(S2) refers to a term that vanishes as S2 goes to zero. For small S,
therefore, we get equation (21) in the text.
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EQUIVALENCE OF AID AND TRADE WITH NO DISTORTIONS
[Percentage Changes Relative to Baseline Calibration]
Aid Aid and Trade "Trade for "Exact" 
Time Period Only Trade Only Aid" Aid
Experiment [1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
Spillover Parameter 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Change in Aid 36.4% 17.5% 0.0% -17.5% 43.2%
Change in Trade Preferences (Mfg) 0.0% 5.0% 10.0% 5.0% 0.0%
Donor Cost  grant 0.864 0.416 0.000 -0.416 1.025
($ millions) preferences 0.000 0.400 0.830 0.418 0.000
Total 0.864 0.816 0.830 0.002 1.025
% of grant  0.0% -5.6% -3.9% 0.4% 18.6%
 SOCIAL WELFARE
Discount  10% to t=1 2.7% 2.8% 3.1% 0.4% 3.1%
to  t=5 4.4% 4.7% 5.2% 0.6% 5.2%
to  t = 25 2.1% 2.3% 2.5% 0.3% 2.5%
to t = inf 2.1% 2.2% 2.4% 0.3% 2.5%
RELATIVE PRICES
Exportables: Qx=Pd/Px t=1 5.3% 1.2% -2.4% -3.9% 6.2%
t=5 5.3% 1.2% -2.4% -3.9% 6.2%
t=25 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Importables: Qm=Pd/Pm t=1 5.3% 5.9% 7.0% 1.1% 6.2%
t=5 5.3% 5.9% 7.0% 1.1% 6.2%
t=25 0.0% 0.0% 7.0% 0.0% 0.0%
QUANTITIES 
Manufacturing Exports t=1 -4.4% 0.0% 3.8% 4.4% -5.6%
t=5 -4.4% 0.0% 3.8% 4.4% -5.6%
t=25 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Total Output t=1 -0.3% 0.6% 1.7% 1.1% -0.5%
t=5 -0.3% 0.6% 1.7% 1.1% -0.5%
t=25 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Consumption t=1 3.6% 4.0% 4.4% 0.2% 4.4%
t=5 3.6% 4.0% 4.4% 0.2% 4.4%
t=25 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
FACTOR MARKETS 
Average Real Wage t=1 5.0% 8.7% 12.9% 4.0% 6.0%
t=5 5.0% 8.7% 12.9% 4.0% 6.0%
t=25 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Average Profit Rate t=1 -0.5% 0.6% 1.6% 1.1% -0.6%
t=5 -0.5% 0.6% 1.6% 1.1% -0.6%
t=25 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Notes:
[1] Social welfare measures the difference in the discounted cumulative utility from t=0  relative to the steady state baseline.
[2] All other results report the percentage difference relative to the baseline calibrated values. [ see Appendix 1] TABLE 2
AID VERSUS TRADE WITH SPILLOVERS AND EXPORT SUBSIDIES
[Percentage Changes Relative to Baseline Calibration]
Aid Only      Trade Only      Trade for Aid Aid cum Subsidy
Time Period
Experiment [1a] [1b] [2a] [2b] [3a] [3b] [4a] [4b]
Spillover Parameter 0.10 0.25 0.10 0.25 0.10 0.25 0.10 0.25
Change in Aid 36.4% 36.4% 0.0% 0.0% -17.5% -17.5% 36.4% 36.4%
Change in Trade Preferences 0.0% 0.0% 10.0% 10.0% 5.0% 5.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Export Subsidy 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -10.0% -15.0%
Donor Cost  grant 0.864 0.864 0.000 0.000 -0.416 -0.416 0.864 0.864
($ millions) preferences 0.000 0.000 0.832 0.837 0.419 0.421 0.000 0.000
Total 0.864 0.864 0.832 0.837 0.003 0.005 0.864 0.864
% of grant  0.0% 0.0% -3.7% -3.1% 0.6% 1.2% 0.0% 0.0%
 SOCIAL WELFARE
Discount  10% to t=1 2.6% 2.6% 3.1% 3.2% 0.4% 0.4% 3.2% 3.2%
to  t=5 4.3% 4.1% 5.3% 5.5% 0.7% 0.9% 5.5% 5.6%
to  t = 25 1.6% 0.3% 2.9% 3.8% 0.8% 1.8% 3.0% 3.8%
to t = inf 1.5% 0.1% 2.9% 3.9% 0.8% 1.9% 2.9% 3.9%
RELATIVE PRICES
Exportables: Qx=Pd/Px t=1 5.3% 5.4% -2.4% -2.4% -3.9% -4.0% -2.2% -2.2%
t=5 5.6% 6.0% -2.5% -2.9% -4.1% -4.5% -2.4% -2.7%
t=25 1.4% 6.9% -1.1% -4.5% -1.3% -5.0% -1.1% -4.3%
Importables: Qm=Pd/Pm t=1 5.3% 5.4% 6.9% 6.9% 1.0% 1.0% 7.1% 7.1%
t=5 5.6% 6.0% 6.8% 6.5% 0.8% 0.5% 7.0% 6.6%
t=25 1.4% 6.9% -1.1% -4.5% -1.3% -5.0% -1.1% -4.3%
QUANTITIES 
Manufacturing Exports t=1 -4.4% -5.0% 3.8% 3.8% 4.4% 4.4% 3.8% 3.8%
t=5 -5.0% -6.3% 4.4% 5.6% 5.0% 6.3% 4.4% 5.0%
t=25 -3.8% -16.9% 3.1% 12.5% 3.1% 14.4% 3.1% 11.9%
Total Output t=1 -0.5% -0.5% 1.7% 1.7% 1.1% 1.1% 1.7% 1.7%
t=5 -0.6% -1.2% 1.9% 2.4% 1.4% 1.9% 1.9% 2.3%
t=25 -1.8% -8.1% 1.4% 6.0% 1.7% 6.8% 1.4% 5.8%
Consumption t=1 3.6% 3.6% 4.4% 4.4% 0.4% 0.7% 4.7% 4.7%
t=5 3.6% 3.3% 4.7% 5.1% 0.7% 1.1% 4.9% 5.1%
t=25 -1.1% -5.6% 0.9% 4.0% 1.1% 4.2% 0.9% 3.8%
FACTOR MARKETS 
Average Real Wage t=1 5.0% 4.9% 12.9% 13.0% 4.1% 4.2% 13.1% 13.2%
t=5 4.5% 3.6% 13.4% 14.3% 4.5% 5.5% 13.5% 14.3%
t=25 -2.7% -12.2% 2.2% 9.5% 2.5% 10.8% 2.1% 9.1%
Average Profit Rate t=1 -0.6% -0.6% 1.6% 1.6% 1.2% 1.2% 1.6% 1.6%
t=5 -0.9% -1.4% 1.9% 2.3% 1.5% 2.0% 1.8% 2.3%
t=25 -1.8% -8.4% 1.5% 6.2% 1.7% 7.1% 1.4% 6.0%
Notes:
[1] Social welfare measures the difference in the discounted cumulative utility from t=0  relative to the steady state baseline.
[2] All other results report the percentage difference relative to the baseline calibrated values. [ see Appendix 1] TABLE 3
AID VERSUS TRADE WITH SPILLOVERS, CAPITAL ACCUMULATION AND EXPORT SUBSIDIES
Neo-Classical Savings Closure
[Percentage Changes Relative to Baseline Calibration]      
Time Period Aid Only      Trade Only      Trade for Aid Trade for Aid Trade for Aid
[with export subsidy] [no export subsidy] [with export subsidy
and fiscal distortion]
Experiment [1a] [1b] [2a] [2b] [3a] [3b] [4a] [4b] [5a] [5b]
Spillover Parameter 0.10 0.25 0.10 0.25 0.10 0.25 0.10 0.25 0.10 0.25
Change in Aid 36.4% 36.4% 0.0% 0.0% -17.5% -17.5% -17.5% -17.5% -17.5% -17.5%
Change in Trade Preferences 0.0% 0.0% 10.0% 10.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0% 5.0%
Export Subsidy 10.0% 15.0% 10.0% 15.0% 10.0% 15.0% 0.0% 0.0% 10.0% 15.0%
Donor Cost  grant 0.864 0.864 0.000 0.000 -0.416 -0.416 -0.416 -0.416 -0.416 -0.416
($ millions) preferences 0.000 0.000 0.952 1.005 0.460 0.484 0.418 0.420 0.458 0.479
Total 0.864 0.864 0.952 1.005 0.044 0.068 0.002 0.004 0.042 0.063
% of grant  0.0% 0.0% 10.2% 16.3% 10.6% 16.3% 0.4% 0.9% 10.0% 15.2%
 SOCIAL WELFARE
Discount Rate =10% to t=1 3.7% 3.9% 5.6% 5.7% 1.1% 1.0% 1.3% 1.4% 1.6% 1.9%
to  t=5 10.6% 11.1% 7.1% 7.1% 2.0% 2.2% 2.4% 3.0% 2.0% 2.4%
to  t = 25 6.7% 4.5% 10.9% 15.6% 2.2% 5.0% 2.4% 5.6% 0.8% 1.9%
to t = inf 6.6% 4.0% 11.0% 16.2% 2.2% 5.4% 2.5% 5.9% 0.8% 2.0%
RELATIVE PRICES
Exportables: Qx=Pd/Px t=1 5.8% 5.9% -2.3% -2.3% -4.2% -4.2% -4.1% -4.1% -4.2% -4.4%
t=5 5.4% 5.7% -1.8% -2.1% -4.4% -4.9% -4.3% -4.7% -4.4% -4.9%
t=25 0.7% 4.8% -3.5% -11.9% -1.5% -6.5% -1.4% -5.6% -1.1% -4.3%
Importables: Qm=Pd/Pm t=1 5.8% 5.9% 7.0% 7.0% 0.8% 0.7% 0.9% 0.9% 0.7% 0.6%
t=5 5.4% 5.7% 7.5% 7.2% 0.6% 0.1% 0.7% 0.3% 0.6% 0.1%
t=25 0.7% 4.8% -3.5% -11.9% -1.5% -6.5% -1.4% -5.6% -1.1% -4.3%
QUANTITIES 
Manufacturing Exports t=1 -3.1% -3.3% 5.1% 5.3% 4.3% 4.6% 4.2% 4.3% 4.2% 4.2%
t=5 -3.2% -4.6% 11.0% 13.4% 5.0% 6.2% 4.8% 5.8% 4.1% 4.7%
t=25 -1.2% -10.2% 9.3% 32.3% 3.6% 15.9% 3.4% 14.3% 2.2% 8.2%
Total Output t=1 0.2% 0.1% 2.0% 2.1% 1.1% 1.2% 1.0% 1.0% 0.9% 0.9%
t=5 0.6% -0.1% 5.6% 6.8% 1.3% 1.9% 1.2% 1.7% 0.7% 0.8%
t=25 -0.3% -4.7% 4.9% 15.5% 1.7% 7.4% 1.6% 6.6% 0.8% 3.0%
Consumption t=1 1.8% 1.9% 2.7% 2.7% 0.5% 0.4% 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% 0.9%
t=5 3.9% 4.0% 2.4% 2.3% 0.6% 0.9% 0.8% 1.1% 0.3% 0.4%
t=25 0.0% -2.9% 3.9% 9.8% 1.2% 4.6% 1.2% 4.9% 0.4% 1.6%
FACTOR MARKETS 
Average Real Wage t=1 4.0% 3.9% 12.4% 12.6% 4.2% 4.4% 4.0% 4.1% 4.3% 4.5%
t=5 4.8% 4.0% 14.8% 16.6% 4.7% 5.8% 4.5% 5.4% 4.3% 5.0%
t=25 -1.0% -8.1% 7.5% 26.5% 2.9% 13.0% 2.7% 11.5% 1.8% 7.1%
Average Profit Rate t=1 0.0% -0.3% 8.3% 8.5% 4.4% 4.6% 4.0% 4.1% 4.3% 4.6%
t=5 -1.8% -2.6% 6.1% 7.5% 4.9% 6.0% 4.5% 5.3% 4.3% 4.9%
t=25 -1.9% -8.0% 3.3% 17.2% 2.3% 10.3% 2.1% 8.9% 1.4% 5.3%
SAVING AND INVESTMENT
Aggregate Savings Rate t=1 15.0% 15.2% 5.7% 5.6% -3.8% -4.0% -3.6% -3.6% -5.2% -6.1%
t=5 9.5% 8.7% 18.0% 19.1% -4.0% -4.7% -3.8% -4.3% -5.1% -6.5%
t=25 0.5% 5.0% -4.2% -12.7% -1.6% -6.8% -1.5% -6.0% -1.4% -6.0%
Private Capital Stock t=1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
t=5 2.6% 2.4% 5.0% 5.2% -0.1% 0.0% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
t=25 1.0% -0.4% 4.2% 7.3% 0.6% 2.3% 0.5% 2.0% 0.4% 1.3%
Public Capital Stock t=1 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
t=5 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -2.0% -3.0%
t=25 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% -1.8% -6.4%
FISCAL BALANCE
Export Subsidies  t=1 -7.1% -7.1% 1.0% 1.0% 4.2% 4.2% 0.0% 0.0% 4.0% 3.8%
[% GDP] t=5 -7.7% -8.2% 3.4% 4.0% 4.3% 4.5% 0.0% 0.0% 4.1% 4.1%
t=25 -0.4% -3.3% 2.4% 7.1% 1.0% 4.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.7% 2.2%
Revenue t=1 1.4% 2.1% -2.4% -2.6% -2.0% -2.5% -1.2% -1.2% -2.0% -2.3%
[% GDP] t=5 1.8% 2.8% -3.3% -4.1% -2.1% -2.6% -1.2% -1.3% -2.0% -2.4%
t=25 0.2% 1.4% -0.7% -3.1% -0.4% -1.8% -0.1% -0.6% -0.3% -1.1%
Expenditure t=1 -0.6% -0.5% -3.5% -3.6% -1.7% -1.8% -1.6% -1.6% -1.6% -1.6%
[% GDP] t=5 -0.6% -0.4% -5.0% -5.3% -1.7% -1.9% -1.6% -1.7% -1.5% -1.5%
t=25 0.0% -1.1% -1.2% -2.8% -0.4% -1.5% -0.3% -1.2% 0.0% -0.3%
Budget Balance t=1 10.2% 13.4% 2.6% 2.0% -3.5% -5.5% 0.4% 0.4% -3.4% -5.1%
[%GDP] t=5 12.5% 16.5% 3.8% 1.4% -3.7% -5.8% 0.4% 0.5% -4.3% -6.6%
t=25 1.0% 0.3% 1.3% -4.4% -0.2% -3.1% 0.6% 2.1% -1.0% -4.4%
Notes:
[1] Export Subsidies are set to optimal values of 10% and 15% given export spillovers of 0.10 and 0.25 respectively. 
[2] Social welfare measures the  difference  in  the discounted cumulative utility from t=0  under the experiment relative to the steady state baseline.
[3] All other results report the percentage difference relative to the baseline calibrated values. [ see Appendix 1 for baseline values.] APPENDIX TABLE 1
SUMMARY DATA FOR SIMULATION MODEL
Sectors Total Total Net
X M Supply ND E CD ID GD Demand XD Exports K/L
Agriculture 2900 330 3230 995 425 1760 50 0 3230 2475 95 0.62
Manufacturing 4475 1210 5685 2690 1760 560 675 0 5685 2715 550 2.25
Services 3490 990 4480 3350 0 1005 125 0 4480 3490 -990 1.54
Public Services 545 220 765 0 0 0 0 765 765 545 -220
Total  11410 2750 14160 7035 2185 3325 850 765 14160 9225 -565 1.00
As share of Total Total Total
X M Supply ND E CD ID GD Demand XD
Agriculture 25% 12% 23% 14% 19% 53% 6% 0% 23% 59.5%
Manufacturing 39% 44% 40% 38% 81% 17% 79% 0% 40% 8.3%
Services 31% 36% 32% 48% 0% 30% 15% 0% 32% 32.3%
Public Services 5% 8% 5% 0% 0% 0% 0% 100% 5% 0.0%
CALIBRATION PARAMETERS 
Sectors
SIG C SIG P OMEGA ALPHAG IOTA TAU TE TM IT
Agriculture 0.80 0.75 0.80 0.25 1.50 0.00 0.0% 10.0% 4.0%
Manufacturing 0.80 0.75 0.80 0.25 1.50 0.50 -1.00 -10.0% 10.0% 18.0%
Services 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 1.50 0.00 0.0% 10.0% 5.0%
Public Services n/a n/a n/a 0.25 n/a 0.00 n/a 10.0% n/a
As share of GDP
GDP 4375 100%
E 2185 50% TARIFF 250 6%
M 2750 63% DUTY -160 -4%
CD 3325 76% INDTAX 225 5%
ND 7035 161% DIRTAX 625 14%
GD 765 17% GR 940 21%
I (priv) 675 15% HHSAV 200 5%
I (gov) 175 4% GSAV 175 4%
DEPR 675 15% AID 475 11%
Notes
Data defined in billions of local currency with the nominal exchange rate set to 1000 per US$.  All data are defined in market prices with world prices normalized to unity.
X = Gross Domestic Output; XD = Domestic Supply to Domestic Market (X-E) ; ND = intermediate demand (by sector of origin); M = imports; E = exports
CD = final consumption; ID = investment (by sector of origin); GD = government current consumption ; TARIFF = import tariffs ; DUTY = export duty / subsidy;
INDTAX = domestic VAT ; DIRTAX = taxes on factor income ; GR = total government revenue ; HHSAV = household saving;  I(priv) = private investment (by
sector of destination) I(gov) = government investment ; GSAV = government savings; CA = AID = current account deficit , fully financed by official net aid inflows;
 K/L capital labour ratio.
SIGC = elasticity of substitution in consumption; SIGP = elasticity of substitution in intermed. consumption ; OMEGA = elasticity of transformation in production ; 
ALPHG = share weight of public capital in private production functions;  IOTA = aggregate return elasticity of investment ; TAU = productivity spillover parameter ;
TE = export duty / (subsidy) as percent of world price; TM = import tariff (as percent of world price); IT = domestic VAT as percent of domestic factor cost.